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## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

## INFORMATION REPORT

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## SOURCE:

1. In April 1951 the North Korean army and the Chinese Communist forces fully expected to retake Seoul with a mass counteroffensive. When they failed, they realized that, for the time being, they would have to abandon hopes of unifying the country through the conquest of South Korea. By June 1951 North Korea was ready for an armistice even if it meant making humiliating concessions. In July 1951 Brigadier General CHANG So-jin, vice-chief of the Foreign Political Intelligence Section, Ministry of Social Security (MSS)<sup>2</sup>, said that the demarcation line after the armistice would probably be close to Sinmak (N 38-25, E 126-14) (BT-5855). Shortly after this statement, CHANG and several of his men made frequent trips to the Sinmak area, presumably to observe and direct fortifications and to establish their headquarters for intelligence activities along the demarcation line. During August and September 1951 the headquarters and military units of the MSS Foreign Political Intelligence Section were transferred to P'yongyang from the nearby hills, and the sending of espionage agents to South Korea was temporarily discontinued. At some time in the fall of 1951 CHANG was relieved of his post and sent to Moscow to attend a political academy. He was replaced by Brigadier General KIM Tong-su (6855/2639/3178)<sup>3</sup> who had direct contact with the Soviet Advisors to the MSS. KIM had spent 20 years in the Soviet Union and was a member of the Soviet Communist Party. In December 1951 KIM said that if North Koreans felt they could win the war, they would not sue for peace, but unfortunately they needed to negotiate for a breathing spell. Also in December 1951 Major General KIM Yang-chun (6855/5328/0193)<sup>4</sup>, then chief of the Foreign Political Intelligence Section, stated that the armistice would actually take place, but the important thing to remember was that it would be only an armistice, not a peace treaty. He said that the North Korean army was much larger than the mere 100,000 or 200,000 man army as was generally believed, and that unification would not be delayed 5 or 10 years as might be expected, but was imminent. Also in December KIM Il-sung was reported to have said in a cabinet meeting that 1952 would be a year of construction and rehabilitation and that the following 3 years would be spent in rebuilding.

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-2-

2. In June 1952 Lieutenant General KIM Ch'un-sam (6855/2504/0005),<sup>5</sup> vice-minister of the MSS said that the armistice would definitely take place despite the opposition of United States capitalists who had profited by the war and wished it to continue. He said that international opinion and American public sentiment were against continuation of the war. He also stated that after the armistice Germany would become the center of international controversy and, therefore, Koreans should study the German situation which was far more vital and significant than many Koreans realized.
3. In May 1953 Minister of Internal Affairs PANG Hak-se (2455/1331/0013), predicted that the armistice would take place very soon and said that the fact that the United States had to ask a fighting nation as small as Korea for an armistice was the greatest shame in American history. It was also evidence, he added, that the "democratic" people of the world would ultimately emerge victorious. KIM Ch'un-sam agreed that the armistice was not a peace treaty and that the unification of Korea was imminent. He said that the Korean problem, as well as that of the whole world, would probably be solved in the near future; the Korean war was a test of both "our"<sup>6</sup> strength and that of the United States. He said that if North Korea's "Big Brother"<sup>7</sup> took part in the conflict, there was no question as to who would be victorious. On 28 July 1953 Brigadier General SIM Won<sup>8</sup>, vice-chief of the Foreign Political Intelligence Section, said, however, that even though the armistice had been signed, Korea would be divided for a few years.

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